A little light reading

I recently came across a really interesting set of papers about the International Criminal Court and its dealings in Uganda -- interesting enough that I'd recommend it even to people without much familiarity with the issue. I find it fascinating because there are at least three layers of debate being hashed out in this discussion, the top layer of which is specific to the ICC, but which conceals other debates that are far deeper and more broadly relevant.

On the surface, the debate is around whether the ICC's indictments against Joseph Kony and four other commanders of the Lord's Resistance Army represent a positive step in the fight against impunity or an impediment to the peace process that may ultimately prevent an end to the conflict in northern Uganda. This is not an easy question, and one that I myself go back on forth on regularly enough to suggest that I will never be entirely comfortable with one answer over the other. It is absolutely the case that Joseph Kony and his ilk have committed some of the worst atrocities of the twentieth century; what their crimes lacked in scale they more than made up for in sheer savagery. It is therefore right that they should be held to account for these crimes, both for moral reasons and because impunity for such acts only ensures that they are committed again in the future by someone else. On the other hand, since Kony knows that the only fate that awaits him upon concluding a peace deal is a lifetime in prison, he is predictably reluctant to sign on the dotted line. The ICC warrants may well be slowing down, if not scuppering altogether, the prospect of peace.

Beneath this largely instrumental debate is another argument, one that is more sociological. This second debate essentially boils down to moral relativism, and whether Justice is an absolute or the product of a particular cultural point of view. Essentially, the pro-ICC camp is arguing that the best way to achieve justice and to fight impunity in Uganda and elsewhere is to submit to Western models of criminal jurisprudence. Warrants, trials, lawyers, judges. Many within the anti-ICC camp, on the other hand, argue that it is wrong to impose such Western models where other, potentially more appropriate, traditional justice mechanisms exist, especially where those mechanisms are deemed more likely to contribute to reconciliation and healing. Perhaps the people of Uganda "don't need or want conventional judicial mechanisms". Surely it must be their choice -- after all, it was they who suffered. But wait, answers the ICC camp -- it is not for them to decide because the implications of their decision will reverberate across time and space, affecting conflicts elsewhere in Africa and beyond. Therefore we must rely on mechanisms that are more widely accepted (i.e. Western mechanisms), however imperfect those might be.

Finally, the third and deepest layer of the debate is one of the most fundamental questions out there: where the interests of justice and peace collide, which deserves priority, and who has the right to decide? Can peace endure if its foundation is unjust, leaving smoldering grievances that could flare up again down the line? Does justice have any real meaning or serve any purpose if it comes at the expense of more innocents suffering?

Whew.

If anyone out there has a definitive answer to any of these questions, I would humbly suggest you think about them again, because you're definitely missing something.